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Thursday 31 May 2012

Bird Flu Redux?

In the past couple of months the story of the creation of a hyper-virulent strain of bird flu by Dutch virologists has caught the attention of many in the scientific establishment as well as those in government. Yes, these results and conclusions has sparked a row over the scientist’s right to publish and has forced us even to question the purpose of the scientific endeavour itself. The US authorities, quite rightly so, raised the issue that publication and possession of this knowledge is a potential target for nefarious exploitation and could usher in a new era of bioterrorism.

In September of 2011, it was reported that Ron Fouchier at the Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam had successfully made a H5N1 virus - which causes bird flu - able to spread between mammals in his lab. This was a feat that had not before been achieved and many virologists had postulated that it was not even possible.

Fouchier’s H5N1 is also miles more infectious than traditional bird flu and was seen to be at least so infectious as seasonal flu. This is the factor that has previously prevented a bird flu pandemic, it's deadly enough but simply too poorly infectious for a deadly killer virus outbreak like in the movies as hyped by the media, and likely never would be.

However, Fouchier and his team have proved this to be wrong. They showed that only five specific mutations were sufficient to transform the virus in to a potential Hollywood style killer.

Initially the virus was given three mutations which before had shown that the virus could be transferred to a mammal. This allowed the virus to infect Fouchier’s mammal of choice - the ferret chosen for its similar response to viral infection to humans - and kill them but not infect fresh healthy subjects. So far business as usual.

The three mutation virus which killed these ferrets then was isolated from dead ferrets and reinfected in to healthy ones in a contained and stringent procedure. This is a common method for making a virus adapt to a new host and was iterated ten times, with virus shed from the tenth test group becoming infectious enough to infect a healthy ferret and kill them.

Fast forward to November and the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (USNSABB) decides to delay the publication of the work of Fouchier et al on H5N1 on grounds that it could in the wrong hands become a weapon or further work on the so-called “armageddon virus” could allow it to escape the lab and enter the population.

As the story stands at this point, things appear to be being hideously sensationalised and misrepresented. Some articles on the subject appeared to imply that Fouchier et al “DELIBERATELY [sic] creat[ed] armageddon bird flu virus” as though their work had been funded by the Lex Luthor Institute for Evil. All Fouchier et al were trying to do was find out if it was possible for H5N1 strains like this to evolve and how it could be prevented, better monitored, treated and cured.

Eventually, Fouchier was allowed to publish by the USNSABB, initially with certain data redacted from the finished paper and made available only to accredited researchers, although this decision was soon overturned and the USNSABB came out in favour of publication.

It was the Dutch authorities who next threatened Fouchier’s right to publish. Since Fouchier’s base at the Erasmus Medical Centre is in the Netherlands he is subject to Dutch law which prohibits the export of weaponisable technology, and they say that potentially this is what Fouchier is hawking. Apparently fed up with the red tape, Fouchier now plans to submit his article to the American journal Science who are protected under to US law to publish any article which has been formally submitted to them, however as of seventh of March 2012, Science are yet to receive correspondence from Fouchier.

This story highlights important issues in science and its relationship with world governments and the apparently rising issue of censorship in science. As I see it, science should never be censored, as the second we begin to put limitations on our knowledge we bolt these limits also to our capabilities as individuals and societies.

Censorship is antithetical to the nature of the scientific endeavour. When we observe phenomena we experiment with them to find out what’s really going on and once we have conclusions we tell everyone about it and welcome their criticism. Censorship could put the clamps on that altogether, then where would be?

In saying this though, science is dangerous, that’s part of what makes it so exciting, so correct measures should be made in order to ensure that dangerous science is used safely and appropriately - by which I mean no weaponisation at all - a task which some might say can be entrusted to no individual government or inter-governmental organisation...

Sources New Scientist Science Nature Discover Magazine

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